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Contemporary American federalism exhibits historically unique
characteristics while retaining characteristics associated with two pre-
vious eras of federal history commonly called “dual federalism” and
“cooperative federalism.” U.S. federalism today can be described as “co-
ercive” because major political, fiscal, statutory, regulatory, and judi-
cial practices entail impositions of many federal (i.e., national govern-
ment) dictates on state and local governments. This era began in the
late 1960s and followed a 35-year era of cooperative federalism. Coercive
federalism has involved a shift in federal policy-making from the inter-
ests of places (i.e., state and local governments) to the interests of per-
sons (i.e., voters and interest groups), thus making the federal govern-
ment much more like a truly national government than ever before.
Elected federal officials, as well as the federal courts, are much more
responsive to nationwide election coalitions, campaign contributors,
and interest groups and much less responsive to the elected officials of
state and local governments than they were during the eras of dual and
cooperative federalism. State and local officials have no privileged voice
in Congress or the White House as elected representatives of the peo-
ple; instead, they must act like interest groups and compete with all
REAF, núm. 6, abril 2008, p. 10-36
Article received 16/01/2008; approved 29/01/2008.10
the other interest groups in the federal policy-making arena where, fre-
quently, they cannot prevail against powerful interest groups that can
bring crucial financial, ideological, and voter rewards and punishments
to bear on the electoral fortunes of federal officials. As U.S. Senator Carl
Levin (Dem-Michigan) commented to this author in 1988, “There is no
political capital [for members of Congress] in intergovernmental rela-
tions,” that is, in responding to the concerns of governors, state legis-
lators, county commissioners, mayors, and the like.
Somewhat paradoxically, though, substantial characteristics of co-
operative federalism still thrive in the administrative interstices of the
federal system. Federal, state, and local bureaucrats generally cooper-
ate and coordinate with each other in implementing intergovernmen-
tal programs and policies. Federal officials (except for federal judges)
are rarely coercive with respect to policy implementation, and state and
local bureaucrats rarely obstruct implementation. Even elected state
and local officials are usually cooperative with respect to policy imple-
mentation. Of course, conflicts arise in intergovernmental administra-
tive relations, but bargaining and negotiation are the principal tools
of conflict resolution, with recourse to the courts being a last resort.
A third facet of American federalism echoes dual federalism inso-
far as it exhibits the continuing vitality of the constitutionally reserved
powers of the states, which allow them to enact a wide range of do-
mestic policies, as well as the federal government’s willingness to leave
some space for independent state action in some policy fields otherwise
occupied by the federal government. This third facet further embodies
another characteristic of the system, namely, as James Bryce noted in
1893, the ability of federalism to enable “a people to try experiments in
legislation and administration which could not be safely tried in a large
centralized country” (Bryce 1907: 353). U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis
D. Brandeis later referred to this facet of federalism as the states serv-
ing as laboratories of democracy (New State Ice Company 1932). Indeed,
one of the salient characteristics of U.S. state and local governments to-
day is a high level of policy activism and innovation (e.g., climate-
change initiatives, health-care reforms, and stem-cell research programs). 
1. Components of Coercive Federalism
Coercive federalism consists, mainly, of the following elements.
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1.1. Federal Grants
For one, federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments dis-
play three new characteristics.
First, aid has shifted substantially from places to persons; al-
most two-thirds of federal aid to state and local governments is now
devoted to payments to individuals (i.e., social welfare). Medicaid
(health care for the poor), which accounts for almost 45 percent of
all aid, is the leading example of this shift in federal aid. By contrast,
in 1978, a historic high point for federal aid, more than two-thirds of
all federal aid was dedicated to place functions (e.g., highways, edu-
cation, criminal justice, economic development, and government ad-
ministration). Among the long-term consequences of this shift is that
place-based aid for infrastructure, economic development, education,
and the like has declined steeply, thus requiring states and localities
to allocate much more of their own monies to those functions. Increased
aid for social welfare has also locked state budgets into programs that
involve increasing federal regulation and matching state costs. For ex-
ample, the states pay 22.9 percent to 50.0 percent of the cost of
Medicaid, depending on their per-capita personal income. Medicaid
has become such a large and expensive program that it consumes, on
average, about 23 percent of state budgets. As such, Medicaid is now
the second largest category of state spending (the first being ele-
mentary and secondary education). Local governments have experi-
enced a steep decline in federal aid because the states manage near-
ly all social-welfare programs. Thus, nearly 25 percent of state revenues
come from federal aid today. By contrast, only about 5 percent (com-
pared to 15 percent in 1977) of municipal revenues come from feder-
al aid. For example, although the number of cities receiving Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds directly from the federal
government increased from 606 in 1975 to 1,128 in 2006, real per-capi-
ta CDBG funding plunged from $48 in 1978 to $13 in 2006 (€10.1 in
mid-2006).
A second characteristic of federal aid under coercive federalism
is increased use of conditions (i.e., regulations) of aid to achieve fed-
eral objectives that lie outside Congress’s constitutionally enumerat-
ed powers and to extract more state-local spending on federal objec-
tives. For example, Congress attached conditions to federal highway
aid requiring all states to increase the legal purchasing age for alco-
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holic beverages to 21 and later to lower the blood-alcohol level need-
ed for a drunk-driving conviction. Constitutionally, these matters be-
long to the states, but the federal government was able to compel all
50 states to enact these policies by threatening to withhold federal
aid for their highways. Such conditions, now often mistakenly called
unfunded or under-funded “mandates,” are a powerful federal pol-
icy tool. States that refuse to comply with these conditions lose fed-
eral program money in increasing proportions, depending on the du-
ration of non-compliance. Because losses can amount to billions of
dollars each year, all states comply with all conditions in the big mul-
ti-billion-dollar grant programs. The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB)
of 2002, a federal education law, is the states’ current bete noire be-
cause of the act’s costly student-testing and school-performance con-
ditions.
The third recent notable federal-aid change under coercive
federalism is congressional earmarking (i.e., state or local pork-barrel
projects). An earmark is an appropriation of money for a specific
project requested by a member of Congress. Earmarks in appropria-
tions bills increased from 1,439 in 1995 to 13,997 in 2005 and then
dropped to 9,963 in 2006, according to Citizens Against Government
Waste. The total price of earmarks increased from $27.3 billion in 2005
to $29 billion in 2006. More than 50 bills, such as the Pork-Barrel
Reduction Act and Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act,
were introduced in Congress in 2005-07 to end or reduce earmark-
ing. None were successful. In January 2008, President Bush signed an
appropriations bill passed by Congress that included a media-esti-
mated 11,144 earmarks costing $15 billion (Editors 2008).
Many state officials oppose earmarks. As a Colorado transporta-
tion department official commented: “Why do we spend 18 months
at public hearings, meetings and planning sessions to put together
our statewide plan if Congress is going to earmark projects that dis-
place our priorities?” (Quoted in Mullins 2006).
1.2. Preemptions of State Powers
Federal preemptions of state laws under the U.S. Constitution’s
supremacy clause (Article VI) are another characteristic of coercive fed-
eralism. Preemption refers to the total or partial displacement of a
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power exercised by the states by a federal law (see Zimmerman 1991;
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1992; Epstein
and Greve 2007). From 1970 to 2004, a period of 34 years, Congress
enacted some 320 explicit preemptions compared to some 200 pre-
emptions enacted from 1789 to 1969, a period of 180 years (National
Academy of Public Administration 2006). Put differently, 62 percent
of all preemptions in U.S. history have been enacted during the past
15 percent of U.S. history.
U.S. Representative Henry Waxman (Dem-California) reported in
June 2006 that during the previous five years, Congress voted at least
57 times to preempt state laws. Of these votes, 27 yielded preemp-
tion bills signed by President George W. Bush.
For state officials, the most egregious recent (2006) preemption
is the National Defense Authorization Act, which allows the presi-
dent to federalize (i.e., take command of) any state’s National Guard
(state army and air-force units commanded by the state’s governor)
without the consent of the governor in the case of “a serious natural
or manmade disaster, accident, or catastrophe” within the United
States, Puerto Rico, or U.S. territories. This law was hastened along
by the terribly incompetent relief effort in New Orleans that fol-
lowed Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
It is also evident that President Bush will use the executive rule-
making process to advance preemption when Congress drags its feet.
For example, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a
prescription-drug labeling regulation in 2006 saying that the FDA’s ap-
proval of manufacturers’ labels “preempts conflicting or contrary state
law.” The rule’s preamble includes language that preempts state lia-
bility laws. Manufacturers who comply with the federal standard
cannot be sued in state courts by persons injured by their products.
Many Democrats accused the FDA of abusing its power. The National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) accused the FDA of inadequate
consultation in formulating the rule, and other critics noted that the
lawsuit-immunization provision was cleverly placed in the preamble,
which is not usually subject to public comment. Ultimately, the feder-
al courts will have to sort out this preemption issue, though mean-
while, some state courts might decide that they are not bound by the
FDA’s rule unless Congress explicitly affirms the preemption in legis-
lation.
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Many state attorneys general and other critics argue that these
and other preemptions disadvantage consumers to the benefit of
corporations. A spokesman for the president’s Office of Management
and Budget replied: “State courts and juries often lack the informa-
tion, expertise and staff that the federal agencies rely upon in per-
forming their scientific, risk-based calculations ... having a single fed-
eral standard can be the best way to guarantee safety and protect
consumers” (Quoted in Labaton 2006).
The Supreme Court frequently upholds preemptions. Indeed, the
formerly “Federalism Five” justices (Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day
O’Connor, William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas)
most often voted against the states in preemption cases even though
they supported the states against federal encroachments in some oth-
er areas of law.
1.3. Mandates
Mandates are another component of coercive federalism. A
mandate is a direct order from the federal government requiring
state and local governments to execute a federal policy. The feder-
al government can impose civil or criminal penalties on state and lo-
cal officials who refuse to comply with a mandate. There has been
a significant increase in mandating since 1964 compared to previous
periods of federalism. Congress enacted one major mandate in 1931,
one in 1940, none from 1941 to 1963, nine from 1964 to 1969, 25
during the 1970s, and 27 in the 1980s (U.S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, 1993). State and local officials espe-
cially criticize unfunded mandates, that is, mandates promulgated
by the federal government without any federal money to help state
and local governments comply with them. However, as a result of
considerable state and local pressure as well as the desire of the new
Republican majority in Congress to limit government, Congress passed
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) in 1995 (Posner 1998).
This law, which constitutes one of the few restraints on coercive
federalism, requires Congress to provide states and localities with
federal money to pay for mandates that exceed $50 million per
year, unless Congress specifically votes not to fund the mandate’s im-
plementation. The law reduced mandate enactments, though it did
not eliminate existing mandates. Only seven intergovernmental man-
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dates with costs above UMRA’s threshold have been enacted since
1995.
The most recent mandate was a 2006 tax law requiring state and
local governments that spend more than $100 million annually to with-
hold 3 percent of their payments to vendors for federal taxes and to
pass that money on to the federal government. The law, which takes
effect in 2011, was opposed by state and local officials. However,
pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Printz v. United States
(1997), the law might be vulnerable to challenge as an unconstitution-
al commandeering of state and local governments. In Printz, the Court
ruled that Congress could not compel (i.e., mandate) local officials to
conduct federally required background checks on persons wishing to
purchase guns.
A sizable new mandate is the anti-terrorism REAL ID Act of 2005.
States argue that it is under-funded and could cost $13 billion (€8.8
billion) for states to produce compliant driver’s licenses that contain
security features to prevent terrorists from obtaining actual or coun-
terfeit licenses. Hani Hanjour, the man who flew the hijacked airlin-
er into the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, had four driver’s licens-
es and identification cards from three states. States, which must comply
with the act by May 2008, can opt out of its rules, but then their res-
idents’ licenses will not be accepted for any federal-government pur-
pose, including boarding an airplane, riding Amtrak trains, purchas-
ing a firearm, opening a bank account, applying for federal benefits
(e.g., Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare), or entering a federal
building. In May 2006, the NCSL, National Governors’ Association (NGA),
and the American Association of [State] Motor Vehicle Administrators
said that the states need more federal money and another eight
years to implement REAL ID.
Many state officials also regard costly conditions of federal aid
as unfunded mandates, and they lobbied in 2006 and 2007 to amend
UMRA so as to include conditions of aid in the act’s definition of un-
funded mandates. By one estimate, federal programs cost state and
local governments some $51 billion in 2004 and 2005 (Wyatt 2006).
However, the likelihood of persuading Congress to add aid condi-
tions to UMRA is almost nil. State and local governments are more
likely to convince Congress to increase funding, though not fully, for
such costly programs as No Child Left Behind and REAL ID.
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1.4. Taxation
Another characteristic of coercive federalism is federal constraints
on state taxation and borrowing, beginning especially with the enact-
ment of limits on tax-exempt private-activity bonds in 1984. Federal ju-
dicial and statutory prohibitions of state taxation of Internet services
and interstate mail-order sales are among the most prominent current
constraints. In November 2004, Congress extended its 1998 Internet
tax ban (i.e., the Internet Tax Non-Discrimination Act) to November 2007,
at which time it extended the ban again to 2014. This federal law pre-
empts state powers to levy taxes on Internet access, connections, and
services (e.g., software downloads). The Supreme Court also has prohib-
ited state and local governments from collecting sales taxes on their res-
idents’ postal, telephone, and Internet purchases of goods from other
states. Congress, however, could permit states and localities to collect
these sales taxes. In response, a number of states negotiated the Stream-
lined Sales and Use Tax Agreement to collect sales taxes on interstate
mail-order sales. The agreement was implemented voluntarily among
consenting states in October 2005. Although several large retailers vol-
untarily comply with the agreement, Congress has not approved the
agreement and authorized states to require sales-tax collection by out-
of-state vendors. Obtaining congressional recognition of the agreement,
even with the new Democratic majority in Congress, will be difficult. 
In 2005, the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform
recommended eliminating deductions for state and local taxes from
individuals’ federal income-tax liabilities. Most state and local officials
oppose removing these deductions. This issue has a partisan electoral
dimension because the average state-local tax payment in blue (Demo-
cratic) states was $7,487 in 2005 compared to $4,834 in red (Republican)
states. State and local tax deductions equaled 5.9 percent of average
income in the blue states and 3.7 percent in the red states (Maggs 2005).
Because most state income-taxes are coupled to the federal tax code,
state officials fear that changes in federal tax laws, especially tax cuts
and retroactive changes, will reduce state tax revenues.
1.5. Federalization of Criminal Law
Another feature of coercive federalism is the federalization of
criminal law, which has historically been predominantly a state respon-
Contemporary U.S. Federalism: Coercive Change with Cooperative...
17
REAF, núm. 6, abril 2008, p. 10-36
sibility. There are an estimated 3,500 federal criminal offenses, more
than half of which have gone into effect since the mid-1960s. These
laws cover a wide range of behavior from terrorism to carjacking,
disrupting a rodeo, impersonating a 4-H Club member,1 and carrying
unlicensed dentures across state lines. Generally, federal criminal
laws are tougher than comparable state laws, including some 50 laws
entailing capital punishment. Several federal laws also impose finan-
cial penalties on states that fail to incarcerate felons for federally
prescribed periods of time.
Another aspect of this federalization of criminal law is an effort
by the Bush administration to enforce federal death-penalty statutes
more vigorously, and to do so, as well, in states that prohibit capital
punishment. In 2006, for example, a federally empanelled jury in North
Dakota imposed the death penalty in a murder case tried under fed-
eral law rather than state law. North Dakota does not have the death
penalty, and this case was the first death sentence issued in the state
since 1914.
1.6. Demise of Federal Intergovernmental Institutions
Coercive federalism has been marked, too, by the demise of ex-
ecutive and congressional intergovernmental institutions established
during the era of cooperative federalism to foster cooperation. Most
notable was the death of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations (ACIR) in 1996 after 37 years of operation. During
the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan abolished the intergovernmen-
tal unit of the Office of Management and Budget, and congression-
al committees devoted to intergovernmental affairs declined and
disappeared from view. There continues to be an office of intergov-
ernmental affairs in the White House and in many executive Cabinet
departments, but these units are primarily political in nature and in-
formational in function. 
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1. 4-H is a 6.5-million-member youth organization (ages 5-19) with some 90,000 local
clubs administered by the Cooperative Extension System of the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA). 4-H stands for head, heart, hands, and health.
1.7. Decline of Political Cooperation
There has also been a decline in federal-state cooperation in ma-
jor intergovernmental programs such as Medicaid and surface trans-
portation. Congress earmarks and alters programs more in response
to national and regional interest groups than to elected state and lo-
cal officials, who themselves are viewed as mere interest groups. A
coalition led by Americans for Tax Reform (ATR) has even petitioned
Congress to terminate the exemption from federal lobbying rules of
state and local government lobbyists. The ATR also wants to deprive
the NGA of state funding, labeling the NGA as just “another liberal
lobbying group” (Ferrara 2005). 
Presidential depletion of National Guard personnel and equip-
ment for the Iraq war also reflects diminished cooperation. All 50 gov-
ernors petitioned the president and the Pentagon for enhanced re-
sources for their National Guard units and for replacements of
equipment left in Iraq. About one-third of the U.S. ground troops in
Iraq belong to state Army National Guard units.
2. The Supreme Court’s Federalism Sputter
From 1991 until 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to foster
a federalism revolution by restricting the reach of Congress under
the U.S. Constitution’s commerce clause, reviving state sovereign im-
munity under the Eleventh Amendment,3 reinvigorating the Tenth
Amendment,3 and protecting state powers in a number of other ways.
This so-called revolution caused a storm of controversy, and even on
the Supreme Court, these state-friendly rulings were always 5-4 deci-
sions, reflecting a sharply split Court over these matters (Kincaid 2001).
Since 2002, the Court has abandoned this revolution such that feder-
alism, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg put it, has been “the dog that
Contemporary U.S. Federalism: Coercive Change with Cooperative...
19
REAF, núm. 6, abril 2008, p. 10-36
2. This amendment states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
3. This amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
[doesn’t] bark” (CNN 2003). This was reflected in two Eleventh-
Amendment sovereign immunity cases in 2006, which held that states
are not immune from suits from disabled prisoners brought under
the Americans with Disabilities Act or from private lawsuits brought
under federal bankruptcy law. The Court also ruled unanimously that
the Eleventh Amendment does not protect local governments from
lawsuits filed under federal law in federal courts (Northern Insurance
Company 2006). Consequently, the Supreme Court, which had long
aided and abetted the rise of coercive federalism and which remains
more conservative than liberal, has not acted in any significant ways
to reverse the course of coercive federalism.
3. Origins of Coercive Federalism
The initial origins of coercive federalism (Kincaid 1993, 1990) lie
in the 1930s and 1940s when the federal government became the dom-
inant fiscal partner in the federal system during the Great Depression
and World War II. In 1927, spending by the federal government amount-
ed to only 31 percent of all own-source government expenditures, com-
pared to 52 percent for local governments and 17 percent for the states.
The federal share had increased to 50 percent by 1940 and to 77 per-
cent in 1958, fluctuating thereafter in the 62-69 percent range (64 per-
cent in 2006). This change placed the federal government in a position
to use fiscal tools to influence state and local government behavior.
Additionally, the New Deal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt
(1933-45) and the Great Society of Democratic President Lyndon B.
Johnson (1963-69) highlighted weaknesses in the ability of state and
local governments to solve the problems of an urban-industrial soci-
ety, cope with national crises, and ensure justice for various minority
populations. Americans began to view the federal government as an
engine for social change and personal benefits (e.g., Medicare and
Medicaid enacted in 1965). The corrupt behavior of many northern
urban political-party bosses and the odious practices of southern white
supremacists discredited states’ rights, prompting William H. Riker to
declare: “if in the United States one disapproves of racism, one should
disapprove of federalism” (Riker 1964: 155).
Furthermore, the rise of the New-Deal idea that the federal
Constitution is a “living document” that judges and legislators must
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adapt to modernity through liberal interpretation, coupled with co-
operative federalism’s view of the federal system as being one gov-
ernment serving one people under conditions of shared responsibili-
ties (Grodzins 1974: 24), fostered a pragmatic federalism that motivated
interest groups and public officials to shop among jurisdictional fo-
rums for favorable policies and to place policy objectives above tra-
ditional constitutional precedents. Constitutional questions of which
government – local, state, or federal – is authorized to do what were
replaced with political questions of which government can do what,
a shift that almost always favored national power.
The rise of coercive federalism was also a massive effort to lib-
erate persons from the tyranny of places, namely, state and local ju-
risdictions, which since the colonial era had governed all the key as-
pects of life that by the 1960s had come to be viewed as oppressive
of blacks, Hispanics, women, gays, and other groups termed “minori-
ties.” Despite the genocidal policies of the federal government to-
ward Indians on the frontier during the nineteenth century and the
U.S. Supreme Court’s historically weak human-rights record, by the
1950s it was the federal government that put on the mantle of indi-
vidual-rights champion against reactionary, uncooperative states.
The era of politically cooperative federalism can be said to have
collapsed in August 1968 during the Democrats’ tumultuous presiden-
tial nomination convention in Chicago. Street protestors and inside
reformers drove the traditional state and local party bosses out of
the nominating system and reoriented the party’s representative
base from places to persons by mandating rules for proportional rep-
resentation of blacks, women, young adults, and other minorities
and by emphasizing primary elections to allow rank-and-file party
members, rather than party leaders, to choose party candidates for
state and federal elective positions. Republicans were more resistant
to such reforms. Hence, while federalism quickly declined as a value
for Democrats, Republicans still defended federalism, at least rhetor-
ically—a position that benefited Richard M. Nixon’s southern-state
strategy for winning the 1968 presidential election by attracting his-
torically Democratic white voters into the Republican Party.
The Chicago convention dramatically reflected the confluence
of political, social, and cultural forces that had been unleashed dur-
ing the late 1950s and early 1960s—a period of personal and politi-
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cal liberation. The preeminent struggle for the liberation of persons
from the tyranny of places was the black civil-rights movement, and
in order to address movement demands, the federal government
had to invade historic realms of state and local authority.
Social-movement demands for nationwide equality assaulted the
legitimacy of the place diversity that had long been sustained by fed-
eralism, which, in turn, had helped to sustain state and local powers.
Reformers asked, for example, why a woman should have a right to
an abortion in one state but not in another. Interest groups spawned
by these movements fostered public awareness of many other issues,
such as environmental degradation and consumer protection, that
crosscut state and local boundaries. More and more public matters
were said to have negative interstate externalities requiring remedi-
al action by the federal government.
By 1962, moreover, 90 percent of U.S. households had a televi-
sion—a potent medium for social movements and for focusing pub-
lic attention on the federal government in Washington, D.C. Television
also changed political campaigns, reducing the role of local political-
party foot soldiers in mobilizing voters and vastly increasing the role
of national interest groups able to fund costly television advertising
for their favored candidates.
The U.S. Supreme Court played a pivotal role, too. For one, it
nationalized much of the U.S. Bill of Rights so as to protect individ-
uals’ rights against infringements by state and local governments, as
well as the federal government. Beginning, as well, with Brown v.
Board of Education in 1954-55, which struck down race segregation
in public schools, the Supreme Court massively expanded federal pow-
er not only to protect individuals’ rights but also to reform state and
local governments. Although this judicial activism substantially abat-
ed after the Court voided state anti-abortion laws in 1973 (Roe v.
Wade), the federal courts had achieved unprecedented levels of rights
protection and intervention into state and local affairs, from which
there has been little retreat, except in rights guarantees for criminals.
Second, the Court’s “one person, one vote” rulings in 1964
(Wesberry 1964; Reynolds 1964) shifted representation in both the U.S.
House of Representatives and the state legislatures from places to per-
sons. Before 1964, most election districts conformed to county and
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municipal boundaries, thereby emphasizing the representation of lo-
cal government jurisdictions rather than individuals and social groups
in legislative bodies. Counties, moreover, were the key power centers
of the political-party system. The full impact of the new apportion-
ment system was felt in the early 1970s, at which time Congress be-
came more individualistic and “atomistic” (Hertzke and Peters 1992)
as members became more attentive to interest groups representing
nationally organized groups of persons and less attentive to home-
town state and local government officials viewed as colleagues bound
by ties of both community and party.
The last powerful political-party machines had collapsed by the
mid-1970s, as symbolized by the 1976 death of Richard J. Daley, may-
or of Chicago from 1955 to 1976. Northern urban machines caved in
as white voters moved to the suburbs, the federal government im-
posed accountability rules on aid to cities, and the courts cleaned up
municipal government. In turn, southern white political-party ma-
chines were decimated by the civil-rights movement, federal legisla-
tion and judicial action, and migrations of northerners into the new-
ly air-conditioned Sunbelt. As a result, southern defenders of states’
rights no longer controlled key committee chairs in Congress, thus
opening the procedural floodgates for federal legislation to override
state and local powers.
The machines’ demise facilitated the rise of professional state
and local bureaucracies and public-employee unions. When the polit-
ical-party bosses controlled patronage employees, they faced little
opposition to their prerogatives. Civil-service employees and unions,
however, frequently welcome federal intervention, as in extensions
of the U.S. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to employees of state
and local governments in 1968, 1974, and 1985. Civil-service employ-
ees sometimes solicit federal intervention to compel their state and
local employers to provide better job benefits, more funds for their
agencies, and more personnel for programs. In some cases, state and
local bureaucrats have used the federal courts to extract funds or
policy concessions from elected state and local officials.
The collapse of the traditional political-party system also opened
the door for greater influence by large corporations and other nation-
al business interests over members of Congress and executive agen-
cies. These interests (as well as business interests in the European Union)
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have pressed the federal government vigorously and often success-
fully for federal preemptions of state and local regulatory powers.
Ordinarily, corporations and other businesses prefer regulation (or
deregulation) by one national regime rather than 50 state regimes
and 87,525 local governments.
In short, contemporary coercive federalism reflects a historical
culmination of forces set in motion at the founding of the United
States. One such force was the purposes for establishing the feder-
al union as articulated by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
John Jay in The Federalist Papers, namely, the protection of liberty
for individuals and the construction of a great commercial republic.
Fulfilling these purposes ultimately required increased assertions of
federal power over the powers of the states and their local govern-
ments. A second force was set in motion by the existence of slavery
at the time the U.S. was founded. This produced two tremendous up-
heavals in U.S. federal development—a military civil war from 1861-
65 and a political-legal civil war from 1954-65—both of which gen-
erated federal coercion of state and local governments on behalf of
black Americans. In addition, the first Earth Day demonstrations in
April 1970 symbolized the emergence of new forces and issues, such
as environmentalism, that were not contemplated by the founders
but which generated public demands for action by the federal gov-
ernment.
4. Federal-State-Local Administrative Cooperation
Leaving behind political and judicial policy-making and enter-
ing the realm of intergovernmental administration of public policies,
however, one finds fairly consistent patterns of intergovernmental ad-
ministrative cooperation, the catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina in 2005
notwithstanding. Indeed, the failure of intergovernmental coopera-
tion and coordination in 2005 triggered enormous controversy and al-
most universal condemnation because that failure was a shocking vi-
olation of long-standing federalism norms. By contrast, in January
2008, the Bush administration acknowledged persistent state com-
plaints about implementation of the REAL ID Act. (For example, about
17 states—Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Maine,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee and Washington—passed leg-
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islation or resolutions objecting to the REAL ID Act.) The administra-
tion extended the deadline for states to provide Americans born af-
ter 1 December 1964 with secure driver’s licenses until 2011. The dead-
line for those born prior to that date was extended until 2017. The
administration also reduced the states’ compliance costs. 
Administrative cooperation has deep roots in American feder-
alism, dating back especially to concepts of intergovernmental coop-
eration articulated by Albert Gallatin in the early nineteenth century
(Rothman 1972). Cooperation was, as Daniel J. Elazar pointed out,
quite prevalent during the nineteenth-century era of so-called dual
federalism when such state-federal interaction was, a priori, deemed
non-existent (Elazar 1962). Such cooperation accelerated tremendous-
ly, of course, during the twentieth-century’s era of so-called cooper-
ative federalism (e.g., Clark 1938). Having such old and deep roots,
therefore, coercive federalism has not smothered this cooperation; on
the contrary, implementation of many of the federal policies im-
posed on state and local governments requires intergovernmental
cooperation for their success. This state and local cooperation with
federal coercion may seem paradoxical; however, it endures because
various forces seek to sustain it.
For one, the carrots and sticks of federal grants-in-aid help to
ensure cooperation. Federal aid accounts for about one-quarter of
state-local budgets. All 50 states, for example, complied with the
federal drinking-age condition attached to surface-transportation aid
because no state could afford to lose the funds and because there is
no apparent mechanism for the states to withhold the federal gaso-
line tax collected within their borders. Second, many federal statutes
associated with coercive federalism contain penalties, including, in
some cases, civil or criminal penalties, aimed at uncooperative state
and local officials.
The courts also play roles in intergovernmental relations. Following
the period of massive resistance by southern state and local govern-
ments to race-desegregation orders issued by federal courts in the
1950s and 1960s, state and local officials became generally coopera-
tive with judicial decisions, which are seen as central to the rule of law.
The federal courts stand as potential hammers to compel compli-
ance; hence, state and local officials have incentives to cooperate with
federal officials. In turn, federal officials, in seeking to foster compli-
Contemporary U.S. Federalism: Coercive Change with Cooperative...
25
REAF, núm. 6, abril 2008, p. 10-36
ance, ordinarily negotiate and bargain with state and local officials
before seeking judicial intervention.
Additionally, the U.S. federal system is not one of executive
federalism (e.g., Germany) whereby states are constitutionally obli-
gated to execute federal framework-legislation (see also Printz 1995).
The federal government is expected, for the most part, to carry out
its own policies or pay the states to do so. Given its very limited ad-
ministrative capabilities, the federal government must seek the assis-
tance of state and local officials. Federal administrators, therefore,
usually have incentives to work cooperatively with their state and lo-
cal counterparts. Furthermore, the federal government does not, per
se, share revenue with the states or engage in fiscal equalization; thus,
it does not need the administrative control and co-decision mecha-
nisms usually required for such policies. Instead, the federal govern-
ment operates a sprawling grant-in-aid system consisting of about
608 categorical grant programs and 17 block grants. Given that
most federal-aid money flows through categorical grants, the feder-
al government exercises control through the purposes for which the
grants are established, but otherwise works cooperatively on the
administration of those grants and usually allows state and local of-
ficials discretion in implementing those grants so long as each grant’s
purposes are realized, at least approximately. Block grants afford state
and local officials even more discretion, although block grants have
never accounted for more than about 18 percent of all federal aid.
Since the fall of massive resistance to race desegregation in the
South, there has been no cultural, ethnic, religious, or linguistic re-
gion in the United States that has had strong incentives to thwart or
distort intergovernmental administrative relations. Similarly, partisan-
ship does not play a major role in intergovernmental administration.
A predominantly Democratic state, for example, is not necessarily
uncooperative, or less cooperative, than a predominantly Republican
state with policies emanating from a Republican Congress and/or White
House. In the political arena, there may be vigorous partisan conflict
over such huge intergovernmental grant programs as Medicaid and
surface transportation and over costly mandates such as environmen-
tal regulations, but once federal policies on these matters are enact-
ed into law, there are strong incentives for local, state, and federal
bureaucrats to cooperate across party lines to administer the programs
as effectively and efficiently as possible.
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In addition, before promulgating regulations to implement laws
enacted by Congress, executive-branch agencies solicit public com-
ment on their proposed regulations. State and local officials partici-
pate in this commenting process and otherwise lobby executive agen-
cies to write regulations compatible with state and local preferences.
State and local officials do not always prevail in this process, al-
though they frequently prevail when they are united and vigorous in
opposing the content of a specific proposed federal regulation.
Due to similar civil-service rules and shared professional norms,
most federal, state, and local administrators blunt the edges of polit-
ical partisanship so as to focus on cooperative task execution under
existing rules and budgets. In addition, federal, state, and local ad-
ministrators within policy fields often share the same education and
training backgrounds and interact with each other in the same na-
tional and regional professional associations, which are usually more
important to them than political-party affiliations. Federal, state,
and local law-enforcement officials, for example, have common train-
ing and professional backgrounds as well as a general professional ca-
maraderie that facilitate interagency cooperation.
Additionally, state and local administrators are often advo-
cates of stronger standards and higher spending in their policy field.
Thus, they often welcome federal intervention. State and local envi-
ronmental officials, for example, are likely to welcome federal rules
that set stricter environmental standards and require more state
and local spending on environmental protection. Indeed, it is not
uncommon for state and local bureaucrats to lobby for federal poli-
cies that are opposed by state and local elected officials who can be
punished at the ballot box for implementing unpopular federal
policies or raising taxes in order to pay for state or local implemen-
tation of those policies. By contrast, administrators are immune
from electoral retribution.
Interest groups play a role, too. After achieving a federal pol-
icy objective, they pressure state and local governments to cooper-
ate in implementing that objective. There has been tremendous
growth in interest-group activity within the states since the late
1960s. One cause of this growth has been the need for interest groups
to induce cooperative state and local compliance with national pol-
icy objectives.
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A process of socialization has occurred as well. The dominance
of the federal government in so many policy fields for the past 40-
some years of coercive federalism has simply become an unquestioned
fact of administrative life. Furthermore, many of today’s senior fed-
eral, state, and local administrators entered public service in the late
1960s and early 1970s with a common passion for reform. For rank-
and-file administrators, the origins of their work dictates are less im-
portant to them than their preoccupation with how to implement
those dictates and satisfy the citizens who will ultimately vote for or
against the elected officials who preside only in a general and dis-
tant way over policy implementation.
For these and perhaps other reasons, cooperative federalism en-
dures in the administrative interstices of coercive federalism. As a con-
sequence, moreover, state and local officials have not uniformly re-
sisted the rise of coercive federalism.
5. State Policy-Activism
A seemingly contrary development under coercive federalism
has been state policy-activism, especially since the early 1980s. As a
journalist who often writes about federalism noted in 1985, the “biggest
gap in elective politics these days is not between Republicans and
Democrats. It is the gap between state officials who are meeting re-
sponsibilities and gaining confidence and federal officials who are
falling down in their jobs and suffering a loss of self-esteem” (Broder
1985). This statement remains true in 2008. For example, while the
federal minimum wage remained stuck at $5.15 (€3.83 in mid-2007)
per hour from 1997 to 2007, 32 states mandated higher minimum
wages for their workers, and while Congress has not been able to pro-
pose an amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibiting gay marriage,
26 states have a constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex
marriage, and 43 states have statutes restricting marriage to a woman
and a man. At the same time, Massachusetts legalized same-sex mar-
riage in 2004. California, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Vermont have
established civil unions that, while not labeled “marriages,” offer
gay couples all the legal rights and responsibilities of marriage. Hawaii,
Maine, and the District of Columbia provide same-sex civil unions
that provide various rights and responsibilities associated with mar-
riage under their laws.
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However, it is important to note that this policy activism has
been both (a) a response to coercive federalism as states have bucked
some federal policies and filled federal policy voids and (b) a stim-
ulant of coercive federalism as interest groups have sought feder-
al tranquilization of hyperactive state policy-making. Thus, this
activism is the third major facet of contemporary American feder-
alism.
This activism is often attributed to the reform and resurgence
of state governments during the 1950s and 1960s. Although reforms
did strengthen state capacities, state policy-activism switched into
high gear in reaction to the rise of coercive federalism under which
both conservatives and liberals have found ever more reasons to seek
refuge in state policy-making when they cannot achieve their ob-
jectives through federal policy-making.
This facet of contemporary U.S. federalism has featured promi-
nently in the so-called culture wars, often producing strange polit-
ical bedfellows and partisan flip-flops. Many liberals, traditionally
champions of federal power, have become guardians of states’ rights,
seeking to protect assisted suicide, gay marriage, medicinal mari-
juana, and a range of state consumer-protection, environmental,
labor, and tort laws against federal preemption. A writer for The
Nation (a left-wing magazine founded in 1865) catalogued recent
liberal legislation from the states and urged liberals to pursue pol-
icy goals through the states (Huevel 2006). In turn, many conserva-
tives, traditionally hostile to federal power, now champion federal
power, with social conservatives seeking to overturn state policies
friendly to abortion, assisted suicide, gay rights, marijuana, and the
like, and economic conservatives seeking federal preemption of state
regulations.
For instance, moral conservatives appalled by U.S. Supreme Court
rulings on abortion and sodomy have sought to thwart such policies
through state regulation. Pro-life (i.e., anti-abortion) activists, for ex-
ample, have been pressing for state laws to add requirements to abor-
tions (e.g., a 24-hour waiting period and parental notification), to pro-
hibit state funding of abortions, and to criminalize injury to a fetus.
According to the American Life League, “You can do a lot more in
the [state] legislatures than on the federal level right now” (quoted
in Associated Press 2003).
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In turn, liberal activists responding to conservative Supreme Court
rulings and to deregulation since the Reagan era have also stimulat-
ed considerable state policy-activism. For example, several multi-
state lawsuits have been initiated against the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency alleging lax enforcement or lack of enforcement
of federal environmental standards. State officials have pursued liti-
gation and regulation in many policy areas, especially environmental
and consumer protection. Connecticut’s attorney general, Richard
Blumenthal, expressed a leading justification for such activism: “Our
action is the result of federal inaction” (Quoted in Masters 2005). Also,
in an effort to compete with the conservative American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC), several hundred state legislators launched
the Progressive Legislative Action Network (PLAN) in 2005. According
to the policy director of the liberal Center for Policy Alternatives, “states
are now the vanguard of the progressive movement” (Quoted in
Cauchon 2003).
State action on environmental protection captured considerable
media attention in 2006-07, especially when California’s governor,
Arnold Schwarzenegger, joined Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United
Kingdom to sign an accord on global warming in August 2006. In
September, Schwarzenegger signed a bill to reduce California’s green-
house gas emissions by 25 percent by 2020. In 2004, California imple-
mented rules on vehicular greenhouse gases that are stricter than
the federal standards. Ten other states have adopted California’s rules,
which limit the amount of carbon dioxide and other gases that auto-
mobiles can expel into the atmosphere. In addition, California, New
York, and eight other states sued the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency for failing to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from power
plants. Some 23 states have set standards requiring utilities to gener-
ate up to 33 percent of their energy from renewable sources by 2020.
In short, using their still considerable powers retained within the
U.S. constitutional system, the states are major actors in domestic
policy-making and, occasionally, minor actors in foreign policy-mak-
ing, such as economic sanctions against various countries (Kincaid
1999). As such, it should be noted that many U.S. states are huge
polities individually. California, for example, with 37.7 million resi-
dents, has a larger population than Canada and all but 34 countries
in the world. According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,
California’s economy ranked tenth in the world in 2005 (with Spain’s
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economy being fourteenth), though the California Legislative Analyst’s
Office contended that the Golden State’s economy ranked eighth in
the world in 2005 (with Spain’s economy being ninth). In January 2008,
Governor Schwarzenegger proposed to the legislature an austere $141
billion (€94.8 billion) 2008-09 state operating budget that includes a
10 percent reduction in state spending in order to cope with an ex-
pected $14.5 billion (€9.7 billion) deficit. Indeed, most U.S. states have
larger economies, revenues, and government budgets than the ma-
jority of the world’s nation-states.
6. Conclusion
In 2009, a new president and a substantially new Congress will
come into power in Washington, D.C. Although these new actors will
certainly make many changes, they will make no significant changes
to the long-term trends in U.S. federalism identified above. Coercive
federalism will remain in place because there are no political incen-
tives, either Democratic or Republican, to initiate a new non-coercive
federalism, there are no longer any credible constitutional grounds
for challenging coercive federalism, and most state and local officials
have acquiesced to the basic tenets of coercive federalism. At the same
time, intergovernmental administrative cooperation will continue to
flourish because, in the final analysis, the federal system cannot func-
tion and serve its citizens without such cooperation. Dual federalism
will persist, as well, because state and local governments are still strong
and important political and governmental arenas with high citizen ex-
pectations of performance. Thus, over the course of 219 years, U.S.
federalism has developed in a complex, multifaceted way that defies
both simple description and linear projection. 
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ABSTRACT
Contemporary U.S. federalism is a complex mixture of coercive, cooperative,
and dual elements. Constitutionally and politically, the federal system has
become coercive because there has been a vast expansion of federal-gov-
ernment power over the states since the 1960s. This coercion involves, among
other things, increased regulations attached to federal grants-in-aid, man-
dates imposed on the states, and federal preemptions of state powers. Neither
the U.S. Senate nor the Supreme Court or the president serves as a protec-
tor of state powers today. Administratively, however, intergovernmental
relations between the federal, state, and local governments remain highly
cooperative. State and local officials implement and comply with federal-
government policies and occasionally obtain concessions and adjustments
in implementation from federal officials. At the same time, the states still
retain considerable residual powers, which, along with their substantial fis-
cal capacities, allow them to engage in independent and innovative policy-
making in a large number of policy fields. State policy activism in such
fields as consumer protection, criminal justice, environmental protection,
health care, and worker rights has, in part, been a reaction against coercive
federalism and, in turn, has often highlighted weaknesses in comparable
federal-government policies.
Key words: American federalism; grants-in-aid; preemption; mandates; co-
ercive federalism; intergovernmental cooperation; U.S. States; U.S. Supreme
Court.
RESUM
L’actual sistema federal dels EUA és una complexa barreja d’elements del fe-
deralisme coercitiu, del federalisme cooperatiu i del federalisme dual. Des
d’un punt de vista constitucional i polític, el sistema federal des de la dècada
de 1960 ha tendit cap a un sistema coercitiu arran de l’àmplia expansió del
govern federal en els àmbits dels estats . Aquesta coerció implica, entre al-
tres coses, un augment de les regulacions vinculades a subvencions federals,
mandats imposats als estats i invasions federals de les competències dels es-
tats. Actualment, ni el Senat ni la Cort Suprema ni el president actuen com
a garants de les competències estatals. No obstant això, des d’una perspec-
tiva administrativa les relacions intergovernamentals entre el govern fede-
ral, el dels estats i els governs locals es mantenen en una situació de forta
cooperació; de fet, els responsables de l’administració local implementen i
compleixen amb les polítiques federals i de vegades aconsegueixen que
l’administració federal els faci concessions i els permeti ajustaments a l’hora
d’implementar-les. Al mateix temps, els estats mantenen, malgrat tot, impor-
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tants competències residuals, les quals, juntament amb les seves substancials
capacitats fiscals, els permeten endegar en un ampli número de camps, unes
polítiques públiques independents i innovadores. Així doncs, la forta activi-
tat dels estats en àmbits com ara la protecció dels consumidors, justícia, pro-
tecció mediambiental, sanitat i drets dels treballadors, ha estat en part una
reacció en contra del federalisme coercitiu i, a més, ha posat sovint en evi-
dència la debilitat de les polítiques federals en aquests mateixos àmbits.
Paraules clau: federalisme als EUA; subvencions; prevalença; assignacions; fe-
deralisme coercitiu; cooperació intergovernamental; estats als EUA; Tribunal
Suprem als EUA.
RESUMEN
El actual sistema federal de los EEUU es una compleja mezcla de elementos
coercitivos, cooperativos y del federalismo dual. Desde una perspectiva cons-
titucional y política, desde la década de 1960 el sistema federal se ha con-
vertido en un sistema coercitivo por la amplia expansión del gobierno fe-
deral en los ámbitos estatales. Tal coerción implica, entre otras cosas, un
aumento de las regulaciones vinculadas a subvenciones federales, manda-
tos impuestos a los estados e invasiones federales de las competencias de
los estados. Actualmente, ni el Senado ni el Tribunal Supremo ni el presiden-
te actúan como garantes de las competencias estatales. Sin embargo, des-
de una perspectiva administrativa, las relaciones intergubernamentales en-
tre el gobierno federal, los gobiernos estatales y los gobiernos locales se han
mantenido altamente cooperativas; de hecho, los responsables de la admi-
nistración local implementan y cumplen con las políticas federales y, en al-
gunas ocasiones, consiguen que la administración federal les haga concesio-
nes y les permita llevar a cabo ajustes en el momento de la implementación.
Al mismo tiempo, los estados todavía mantienen importantes competen-
cias residuales, que, junto con sus substanciales capacidades fiscales, les
permiten llevar a cabo unas políticas públicas independientes e innovado-
ras en un buen número de campos. Así pues, la importante actividad de los
estados en ámbitos tales que la protección de los consumidores, justicia, pro-
tección medioambiental, sanidad y derechos de los trabajadores, ha sido, en
parte, una reacción ante el federalismo coercitivo y, a su vez, ha puesto en
evidencia la debilidad de las políticas federales en estos mismos ámbitos.
Palabras clave: federalismo en EUA; subvenciones; prevalencia; asignaciones;
federalismo coercitivo; cooperación intergubernamental; estados en EUA;
Tribunal Supremo en EUA.
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